Going Nuclear

The UK's ambition to achieve net zero by 2050 is an enormous undertaking, and many acknowledge that achieving such a goal requires an increase in nuclear energy capacity and therefore an increase in the number of nuclear sites across the UK. In this blog, colleagues from the Dalton Nuclear Institute, William Bodel, Adrian Bull, Gregg Butler, Juan Matthews and Francis Livens, assess some of the questions concerning nuclear plant siting which face us.

• The UK is set to miss its next two carbon budgets, the milestones to achieving net zero by 2050.
• This coincides with annual nuclear power output in the UK being at its lowest for 40 years.
• The future vision for nuclear in the UK right now and 2050 is anticipated in three waves, with the final wave of high temperature plants offering potential beyond traditional electricity generation.
• Currently, we do not have enough sites allocated to accommodate an expansion of the nuclear sector of the necessary scale. More sites will be needed, and effort will be needed to gain the local approval needed to proceed with new nuclear build.

The challenge of net zero

In 2019, the UK government legislated to increase its previous ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, committing to net zero emissions by 2050. The Climate Change Act also lays out the carbon budgets – legally binding interim targets for GHG reduction, split into periods of five years. While the first three budgets have been met, the UK is set to miss its fourth and fifth carbon budgets.

Given the challenge of net zero, coupled with the low life cycle of GHG emissions which result from nuclear power, many now acknowledge that expansion of nuclear energy is required if net zero is to be reached. Beyond the environmental motivations, the recent volatility in energy prices has also reiterated the value of a diverse energy mix in protecting energy users from sharp price rises.

Agreement that there is a future for nuclear in the UK is welcome, however time to act is now limited. The UK’s nuclear output has been shrinking since its peak in 1998, owing to the closure of ageing stations – last year’s output was less than half that of 1998, and the lowest since 1982. This lost capacity will have to be replaced before the net output from nuclear energy can increase.

The three wave strategy

To tackle this, the current “Three Wave” strategy envisages the delivery of three broad reactor types over the next thirty years:

1. Light Water Reactors (LWRs), such as those currently being constructed at Hinkley Point.
2. Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are small versions of LWRs, anticipated to be deployable in the early 2030s.
3. Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs), assumed to be in the form of High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), with ambitions for a demonstrator plant by the early 2030s.

The current generation of LWRs are large and complex engineering projects, with the planned nameplate capacity of Hinkley Point C to be 3.3 GW, for context – the average UK electricity demand during 2018 was 31.4 GW. Building new stations like this takes years, which adds to the overall cost of the electricity produced. By reducing the physical size of LWRs, reactor modules can be built in factories and assembled more easily on-site, reducing costs. More exotic, advanced reactor designs offer potential benefits such as greater uranium efficiency or higher operating temperatures, but are years away from deployment. High temperature reactors are useful because their heat can be used directly in industrial processes which are otherwise difficult to decarbonise, or in generating hydrogen more efficiently than is possible through room temperature electrolysis. Figure 1 shows the imminent decline of the existing reactor fleet, and the potential rebuilding with the Three Waves:

Ambitious scenarios use examples involving hundreds of reactors to provide the energy needed to replace fossil fuels, less ambitious programmes would still require many tens of reactors on tens of sites. As only eight sites have been deemed potentially suitable for the deployment of new nuclear power stations in England and Wales before the end of 2025, an unavoidable consequence of such a desired expansion of the nuclear sector is a requirement for new sites to host future nuclear plants. This is important, because new sites, i.e. those with no historic nuclear presence, will require the acceptance of new reactor build in areas with surrounding publics with no experience of, or vested interest in, a new local reactor.

Community support for nuclear

When considering new sites for nuclear stations, it is worth bearing in mind that the last UK nuclear site to be opened was Torness, where work on the site’s nuclear plant started over 40 years ago. Both the UK nuclear industry and the processes involved in granting permission to developments have changed very significantly since then – local acceptance looms considerably larger in the process than it did in the past. The necessity for new sites prompts a need for local acceptance of a sort that has not been sought for almost half a century. Assuming community support for new build, even in existing nuclear communities, could prove complacent – especially where previous plants may have been perceived to have damaged the environment or left other negative legacy behind. Important questions will be asked about many aspects of the nuclear legacy, from the traditional concerns around nuclear waste, to that of the decommissioned plants which seem to have become permanent features on the landscape.

The solution

One area where lessons for a potential solution can be found is that of efforts made to find a suitable site to host a nuclear Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The process has been a long one, with failures resulting from opposition from county council levels in 1997 and 2013, the latter in spite of approval from the district level. The current local consent-based approach seems to be making measured progress on a GDF, with three areas currently involved in local engagement processes. This progress, while modest, might be instructive on how to progress with regional consent for new nuclear energy sites.

The Dalton Nuclear Institute has released a position paper, containing nine recommendations for government and industry. The overarching recommendation is for government to develop an integrated framework for the delivery of nuclear energy in the UK. A solid understanding of the full lifecycle of future nuclear provision will be essential to ensure that a suitable nuclear sector can be delivered by 2050.

William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.

Gregg Butler is Head of Strategic Assessment for The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. He has published extensively on a broad range of nuclear topics, and was a member of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management from 2012 to 2019.

Juan Matthews is Visiting Professor in Nuclear Energy Technology at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. With a career spanning over 50 years, he has experience in nuclear and high technology industries across Europe, Asia, Russia and the Americas, and was formerly the nuclear specialist at UK Trade and Investment (now Department of International Trade).

Francis Livens is Director of The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute and Professor of Radiochemistry. He has acted as an advisor to the nuclear industry both in the UK and overseas and holds a range of external roles, including Chair of the Nuclear Innovation and Research Advisory Board (NIRAB) and a member of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Board.

Adrian Bull is BNFL chair in Nuclear Energy and Society at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. Until June 2022 he was also Director of External Relations for the UK National Nuclear Laboratory. He is closely involved with a wide range of stakeholders including politicians, Government officials, media, customers, industry organisations and universities, and was awarded an MBE for his work on improving stakeholder engagement around nuclear issues.

The world’s climate and energy crises continues to worsen with extreme weather, heatwaves and increasing global energy prices. The IEA’s net zero by 2050 pathway has identified the need for nuclear, including SMRs growing support for this in the UK, Canada, France and the US. In this blog, Aneeqa Khan discusses the steps needed to develop a framework to secure a long-term nuclear future.

• The UK should invest in multi-level training opportunities for individuals through apprenticeships, undergraduate and doctoral training, as well as cross industry training for people to move into the new nuclear sector, with a focus on fission (including small modular reactors – SMRs) and fusion.
• Provision of a framework for these opportunities should be made available internationally with a focus on developing countries, and those most vulnerable to climate change.
• The UK nuclear industry should develop strong collaborative partnerships with countries with a developing nuclear industry and foster a culture of knowledge exchange.

Long term energy planning versus short term solutions

In August, EDF shut down the two reactors at Hinkley Point B, equivalent to a loss of almost a GW of power generation. They also said they will extend the use of the West Burton A coal power plant, with discussions continuing to potentially keep a further 2 coal power plants open. Billed as ‘short term’ strategies, these interventions do not provide a long term solution, and contradict the aims of the UK Government’s Energy Security Strategy released in April 2022, which aims to deliver clean energy and commits to building one nuclear reactor a year.

We should be extending existing nuclear technologies to cover the bridging over to advanced nuclear reactors, which must continue to receive funding and support. Issues of finance, regulation, the role of Government, siting, public and community acceptance, as well as the integration of nuclear into wider energy strategies including heat and hydrogen must also be addressed. The energy security strategy needs to address training by working with universities and other education providers to ensure there is no skills shortages across these vital areas.

Investing in education and skills

COP26 and COP27 have recently highlighted the need for more young people to be trained to deliver nuclear energy goals. Government investment in nuclear education and training is needed with a key focus on advanced fission (including SMRs) and fusion reactor concepts.

This should include dedicated modules for undergraduate and postgraduate degrees across a range of disciplines; from science, to engineering and regulation, doctoral training centres that address the challenges in delivering advanced reactor concepts, as well as apprenticeships, and training opportunities in advanced reactor concepts for those already working in a relevant field. The University of Manchester offers a fully funded, four-year Centre for Doctoral Training (CDT) PhD in GREEN (Growing skills for Reliable Economic Energy from Nuclear) in addition to the PhD Fusion Energy CDT.

A lack of adequate investment in skills and training could lead to a shortage in the skilled workforce, which the nuclear industry will need to combat the climate emergency, as part of a sustainable energy mix that includes renewables.

Global collaboration

Climate change adversely affects countries and communities that have least contributed to it. Therefore shared knowledge skills may help to catalyse our global transition towards a low-carbon society. This may allow communities most affected by climate change to benefit from the use of new nuclear energy technology.

Policymakers and the nuclear industry need to work with communities directly in an open and transparent way and work with other industries such as housing, water, solar, and wind in order to find synergies and ways we can share mutual knowledge aiming to combat climate change. According to the World Nuclear Association, there are around 30 countries who are ‘considering, planning or starting nuclear power programmes.’ This includes Bangladesh (where it is predicted up to 1 in 7 people could be displaced by climate change by 2050) where construction of power plants have started, as well as countries with developing plans such as Nigeria, Kenya and Laos.

There are challenges in terms of the grid system – if we talk about large power plants it can be difficult to have large amounts of power in one place for an infrastructure not built for that. If the power plant needs to be taken offline for maintenance, this can be detrimental if it accounts for a significant amount of the electricity on the grid. AMRs (advanced modular reactors) and SMRs may be an answer for this as they will be much smaller. Grid infrastructure may require upgrading in general. Other challenges are the licensing of reactor designs, and often countries with developing nuclear rely on countries with developed nuclear power. Sharing skills will allow countries to have autonomy and support in developing nuclear power and therefore transitioning towards secure, clean energy.

There should also be a focus on countries with existing nuclear power, such as South Africa, Pakistan, and Mexico to further expand and collaborate. This will amplify the UKs position as a global leader on climate responsibility and also foster knowledge exchange of technologies, manufacturing and collaboration.

Only with a collaborative approach that crosses man made borders and incorporates multiple industries will we be able to address the skills gap – creating a future where nuclear plays a role in providing low carbon energy.

Dr Aneeqa Khan is a research fellow in Nuclear Fusion working at the University of Manchester at Harwell and in the School of MACE.

Europe is struggling through a period of exorbitant energy prices. In addition to directly hitting consumers with a higher cost of living, high energy prices will also have detrimental effects on business and industry. In this blog, Will Bodel from the Dalton Nuclear Institute examines the role of nuclear energy in reducing the cost of energy, and discusses their funding and financing.

• New nuclear energy could provide a significant amount of Britain’s energy needs, which will help insulate against future energy shocks.
• Nuclear energy can be cost-effective, but requires a sensible approach to financing, which Government must facilitate.
• Progress has been made in developing a RAB financing model. The full details of the RAB are yet to be defined, but it is important to ensure that the operational costs are reasonable.

The current energy crisis

In August, Ofgem announced that the price cap (the backstop protection limiting the unit price suppliers could charge for energy), would rise to £3,549 for October-December 2022, a sharp increase from £1,250 last winter. With forecasters predicting prices would hit £4,500 in 2023, Government announced an Energy Price Guarantee, limiting the cap to a lower level to help protect consumers, with the taxpayer compensating energy suppliers the difference.

Government’s medium-term strategy remains to be seen, but it must involve starting to put in place a more resilient energy system to prevent recurrence. While new nuclear power can do little about the immediate problem, it has an important role in the long-term reshaping of the system and preventing such vulnerability in the future.

How could such a situation have been avoided?

One answer would have been a diversification of generation capacity; a broad portfolio of generation technology reduces vulnerability when one source becomes scarce. This is hardly a shocking revelation, and the use of energy supply as leverage is also nothing new – such a sentiment was expressed throughout the 2008 Energy White Paper:

“The majority of the UK’s nuclear power stations are due to close over the next two decades. Over the same period, the UK will become increasingly reliant on imports of oil and gas, and at a time of rising global demand and prices, and when energy supplies are becoming more politicised.”

Coal use had all but vanished in the UK as carbon reductions for net zero were pursued, and only five nuclear power plants remain operational (down from 16 in 2000). Meanwhile, the expansion of renewables proves a double-edged sword as gas is needed to fill in the gaps in their intermittency.

A role for nuclear?

Electricity from nuclear is low-carbon, not reliant on resources located in politically volatile regions, reliable, and cheap to fuel and maintain. Given all this, and if almost 15 years ago it was identified that new nuclear should be built, why is Hinkley Point C still the only nuclear plant under construction?

The reason is financing – a paradox exists on the economics of nuclear. Small marginal costs make nuclear power plants price competitive over their long (60+ year) lifetime, but this is only realised after the large initial capital costs are expended and the plant becomes operational. Long build times must be endured before any return on investment is seen, and it is during this long, high-risk  construction period that financing costs balloon to dominate the total cost per unit of electricity (see Figure 1).

Financing options

Since Sizewell B (our most recent nuclear power plant) was built, state-financing nuclear power has been unpopular, and the huge capital costs and long repayment period has deterred private investment – alternative financing solutions have therefore been sought.

In 2012 the government committed to a Contract for Difference (CfD) for Hinkley Point C. This ensures that the operator EDF bears risk in delivering the project and funds eventual decommissioning, albeit with a government debt guarantee. Once built, the CfD guarantees EDF a minimum “strike price” of £89.50/MWh (inflation-linked, so £114 in today’s money) for 35 years after the project completion. At the time, with wholesale electricity prices just under £50/MWh, this was described by many as a bad deal for future bill payers, who are ultimately responsible for paying the strike price – but compared to today’s prices, the HPC strike price look rather better. That said, estimates from the Committee on Climate Change in 2013 predicted onshore wind costs in 2020 of £80/MWh and offshore wind £120/MWh, so the HPC strike price seemed not too bad a deal for reliable, low carbon electricity at the time.

A better deal may not have been possible using this financing method. While the strike price seems high by 2012 standards, the developer in a CfD shoulders the burden of constructing the plant – and the associated risk. Such an undertaking warrants such a strike price. The failure of other contemporary nuclear projects at Moorside and Wylfa (CfDs with lower strike prices) due to financing issues indicates how ineffective this method is for financing nuclear projects.

Alternative financing methods have been proposed, but the one identified as having the greatest potential is the Regulated Asset Base (RAB), the model used to fund Heathrow Terminal 5 and the Thames Tideway Tunnel. The RAB aims to make the whole process more affordable by empowering a regulator to levy charges on consumers while a plant is being built. While this means bill-payers will be paying for a plant which isn’t producing electricity yet, because project owners will be able to settle financing costs sooner in the life of the project (reducing the size of the green slice in Figure 1), this stops the financing costs from spiralling during the construction period. These savings can then be passed on to consumers in the form of cheaper electricity per unit, with figures of £40-£60/MWh being touted for electricity from future nuclear plants built according to this financing model.

The Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill, introducing the RAB for nuclear received Royal Assent in March, but not all the details of how it will be operated have been decided. The latest step in the process, the Government’s consultation on the RAB revenue stream, closed in August and is currently being analysed. As the details are finalised it is important that the Government, and the relevant regulator, ensure the best possible deal for the consumer.

William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.