Going Nuclear

Foreword
We are at an important stage in the development of nuclear energy, with government pledging to deliver Great British Nuclear, a new public body, to bring forward projects and progress existing plans. This is especially timely, as the need for nuclear energy as a vital component of a portfolio of sustainable energy sources is brought into even sharper focus by the energy price crisis.
Recent announcements indicate that policymakers in government agree nuclear energy projects are crucial to reducing our reliance on fossil fuels, support energy security, and help us to meet our net zero ambitions with reliable clean energy. However, there are further policy pathways to take in order to ensure nuclear energy can fulfil its potential, support our transition to net zero and deliver energy security.
This collection features research and evidence-led recommendations from prominent experts in the field of nuclear energy. The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute work closely with the nuclear industry, and highlight the steps needed to develop a policy framework which can secure a long-term nuclear future. From the importance of skills and training, to developing new reactors, to legislative clarity and rapid progression of programmes to meet the 2050 net zero deadline.
Progress in the nuclear industry has followed a pattern of start and stall under successive governments in the last decade – that must change if we are to catalyse our nuclear capability. The Dalton Nuclear Institute and Policy@Manchester recommendations in this collection provide thought leadership on the next steps to secure nuclear energy in a low-carbon and cost-effective energy transition.
Dr Maria Sharmina
Reader in Energy and Sustainability at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
Policy@Manchester Academic Co-Director

Building nuclear for a greener future
William Bodel, Gregg Butler, Juan Matthews, Francis Livens and Adrian Bull

The UK's ambition to achieve net zero by 2050 is an enormous undertaking, and many acknowledge that achieving such a goal requires an increase in nuclear energy capacity and therefore an increase in the number of nuclear sites across the UK. In this blog, colleagues from the Dalton Nuclear Institute, William Bodel, Adrian Bull, Gregg Butler, Juan Matthews and Francis Livens, assess some of the questions concerning nuclear plant siting which face us.
- The UK is set to miss its next two carbon budgets, the milestones to achieving net zero by 2050.
- This coincides with annual nuclear power output in the UK being at its lowest for 40 years.
- The future vision for nuclear in the UK right now and 2050 is anticipated in three waves, with the final wave of high temperature plants offering potential beyond traditional electricity generation.
- Currently, we do not have enough sites allocated to accommodate an expansion of the nuclear sector of the necessary scale. More sites will be needed, and effort will be needed to gain the local approval needed to proceed with new nuclear build.
The challenge of net zero
In 2019, the UK government legislated to increase its previous ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, committing to net zero emissions by 2050. The Climate Change Act also lays out the carbon budgets – legally binding interim targets for GHG reduction, split into periods of five years. While the first three budgets have been met, the UK is set to miss its fourth and fifth carbon budgets.
Given the challenge of net zero, coupled with the low life cycle of GHG emissions which result from nuclear power, many now acknowledge that expansion of nuclear energy is required if net zero is to be reached. Beyond the environmental motivations, the recent volatility in energy prices has also reiterated the value of a diverse energy mix in protecting energy users from sharp price rises.
Agreement that there is a future for nuclear in the UK is welcome, however time to act is now limited. The UK’s nuclear output has been shrinking since its peak in 1998, owing to the closure of ageing stations – last year’s output was less than half that of 1998, and the lowest since 1982. This lost capacity will have to be replaced before the net output from nuclear energy can increase.
The three wave strategy
To tackle this, the current “Three Wave” strategy envisages the delivery of three broad reactor types over the next thirty years:
- Light Water Reactors (LWRs), such as those currently being constructed at Hinkley Point.
- Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are small versions of LWRs, anticipated to be deployable in the early 2030s.
- Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs), assumed to be in the form of High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), with ambitions for a demonstrator plant by the early 2030s.
The current generation of LWRs are large and complex engineering projects, with the planned nameplate capacity of Hinkley Point C to be 3.3 GW, for context – the average UK electricity demand during 2018 was 31.4 GW. Building new stations like this takes years, which adds to the overall cost of the electricity produced. By reducing the physical size of LWRs, reactor modules can be built in factories and assembled more easily on-site, reducing costs. More exotic, advanced reactor designs offer potential benefits such as greater uranium efficiency or higher operating temperatures, but are years away from deployment. High temperature reactors are useful because their heat can be used directly in industrial processes which are otherwise difficult to decarbonise, or in generating hydrogen more efficiently than is possible through room temperature electrolysis. Figure 1 shows the imminent decline of the existing reactor fleet, and the potential rebuilding with the Three Waves:
![Graph showing the decline of the existing UK nuclear fleet, and the potential future Three Waves of nuclear [adapted from NIRAB]. The LWR plot assumes successful completion of Hinkley Point C and two sister stations.](./assets/uw89gntXQ5/nuclear-300x196-300x196.png)
Figure 1. The decline of the existing UK nuclear fleet, and the potential future Three Waves of nuclear [adapted from NIRAB]. The LWR plot assumes successful completion of Hinkley Point C and two sister stations.
Figure 1. The decline of the existing UK nuclear fleet, and the potential future Three Waves of nuclear [adapted from NIRAB]. The LWR plot assumes successful completion of Hinkley Point C and two sister stations.
Ambitious scenarios use examples involving hundreds of reactors to provide the energy needed to replace fossil fuels, less ambitious programmes would still require many tens of reactors on tens of sites. As only eight sites have been deemed potentially suitable for the deployment of new nuclear power stations in England and Wales before the end of 2025, an unavoidable consequence of such a desired expansion of the nuclear sector is a requirement for new sites to host future nuclear plants. This is important, because new sites, i.e. those with no historic nuclear presence, will require the acceptance of new reactor build in areas with surrounding publics with no experience of, or vested interest in, a new local reactor.
Community support for nuclear
When considering new sites for nuclear stations, it is worth bearing in mind that the last UK nuclear site to be opened was Torness, where work on the site’s nuclear plant started over 40 years ago. Both the UK nuclear industry and the processes involved in granting permission to developments have changed very significantly since then – local acceptance looms considerably larger in the process than it did in the past. The necessity for new sites prompts a need for local acceptance of a sort that has not been sought for almost half a century. Assuming community support for new build, even in existing nuclear communities, could prove complacent – especially where previous plants may have been perceived to have damaged the environment or left other negative legacy behind. Important questions will be asked about many aspects of the nuclear legacy, from the traditional concerns around nuclear waste, to that of the decommissioned plants which seem to have become permanent features on the landscape.
The solution
One area where lessons for a potential solution can be found is that of efforts made to find a suitable site to host a nuclear Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The process has been a long one, with failures resulting from opposition from county council levels in 1997 and 2013, the latter in spite of approval from the district level. The current local consent-based approach seems to be making measured progress on a GDF, with three areas currently involved in local engagement processes. This progress, while modest, might be instructive on how to progress with regional consent for new nuclear energy sites.
The Dalton Nuclear Institute has released a position paper, containing nine recommendations for government and industry. The overarching recommendation is for government to develop an integrated framework for the delivery of nuclear energy in the UK. A solid understanding of the full lifecycle of future nuclear provision will be essential to ensure that a suitable nuclear sector can be delivered by 2050.
William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.
Gregg Butler is Head of Strategic Assessment for The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. He has published extensively on a broad range of nuclear topics, and was a member of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management from 2012 to 2019.
Juan Matthews is Visiting Professor in Nuclear Energy Technology at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. With a career spanning over 50 years, he has experience in nuclear and high technology industries across Europe, Asia, Russia and the Americas, and was formerly the nuclear specialist at UK Trade and Investment (now Department of International Trade).
Francis Livens is Director of The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute and Professor of Radiochemistry. He has acted as an advisor to the nuclear industry both in the UK and overseas and holds a range of external roles, including Chair of the Nuclear Innovation and Research Advisory Board (NIRAB) and a member of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Board.
Adrian Bull is BNFL chair in Nuclear Energy and Society at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. Until June 2022 he was also Director of External Relations for the UK National Nuclear Laboratory. He is closely involved with a wide range of stakeholders including politicians, Government officials, media, customers, industry organisations and universities, and was awarded an MBE for his work on improving stakeholder engagement around nuclear issues.

The Energy Security Strategy: Going nuclear
Francis Livens


In April, the government announced plans to build eight new nuclear reactors in the UK, alongside strategies to boost wind, hydrogen, and solar production. These reactors are intended to improve the UK’s energy self-sufficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as creating thousands of new jobs. In this blog, Professor Francis Livens of the Dalton Nuclear Institute breaks down what these plans mean, and the best routes to meeting them.
- If all of the goals in the new strategy are met, nuclear could provide 20 – 25% of our electricity needs by 2050.
- However, this requires rapid action on the part of policymakers, expediting planning approval and minimising our dependence on global supply chains.
- In parallel, the same urgency has to be given to developing new reactors which will meet our low-carbon energy needs beyond the end of the decade.
Having seen the shape of government’s energy security plans, it’s clear they require a fundamental change in the way we ‘do nuclear’. We aren’t going to accelerate from one reactor a decade to one a year, and then onwards to 24 GW (about 15 Hinkley Point C reactors) by 2050, without transforming the whole sector. It’s worth unpicking some of what this plan means.
What are we going to build?
At the moment, the only stations planned or under construction in the UK are EdF’s European Pressurised Water Reactors (EPR), at Hinkley and potentially Sizewell, with two reactors at each site. This is a mature design so deployment will be limited by the supply chain – you order specialist nuclear components many years in advance – and workforce availability. Realistically, if we started today, we’d be doing incredibly well to get Sizewell C operating by the end of the decade, so EdF aren’t going to get us beyond half way to our eight reactors.
If we look elsewhere, there is interest from an American consortium in building two Westinghouse AP1000 reactors at Wylfa on Anglesey. This reactor has already been approved by the UK regulators but has a mixed history, with four operating in China, while some American projects are going badly wrong. The design is workable; the challenge is delivering the project.
Finally, there are ‘Small Modular Reactors’ (SMR). These are quite different in conception, with the aim being to build them in kit form in a factory and then assemble them on site. One contender is the Rolls-Royce SMR. Nobody’s built one of these so far, but it is based on well-understood technology (so not too risky), and the design started the regulatory approval process earlier this month. Approval could take up to four years, and construction of the first reactors a further four or five years, so there’s no slack here if we’re to meet the end-of-decade goal. What’s more, a lot depends on how much risk Rolls-Royce might be prepared to take; for example, building factories and manufacturing components in advance of regulatory approval. With a fair wind, we could have a couple of these by 2030.
The biggest risk on the 2030 timescale is therefore not really the technology, but our ability actually to deliver these big, complex projects – a problem that’s not unique to nuclear or the UK, as we see from the American AP1000 projects, London 2012, or HS2. Setting realistic budgets and schedules will be crucial to ensuring this project is delivered in time to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.
What else do we need?
Nuclear energy isn’t just about the reactor. You need a site to build on and, while it’s likely that all the pre-2030 reactors would use existing nuclear sites, it might be necessary to smooth the transfer of land from the current owner (probably the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority) to the new build developer. There are also several other strands of planning and similar activity which would need to be expedited.
Regulatory approval, which is often seen as a blockage, doesn’t have much impact on the programme before 2030. The EPR and AP1000 have already been approved, though acceleration could take a year or so of the SMR timeline. It might have more impact if other designs came into the frame, but those are more likely beyond 2030, or if we want to introduce advanced technologies, such as the use of digital simulations in design.
The biggest risk is around project delivery. The UK has a nuclear supply chain and a skilled nuclear workforce, but these are spread across decommissioning, new nuclear, and defence, all of which present increasing demand. We are also dependent on global supply chains for some critical elements, and as a result will be in competition with other countries which are following similar thought processes to us. There is no point in having everything ready to go, and then finding yourself waiting 3 years for the reactor pressure vessel.
You can mitigate the supply chain and skills risks by giving the sector confidence to invest, but that requires clarity and commitment from government, and – perhaps hardest of all – a seamless approach across multiple government departments. The new strategy provides a solid framework; the challenge is in ensuring its goals are met on time and at cost, and will require a clear and consistent vision from policymakers.
If we do all this, though, we could just about get to 2050 with nuclear providing 20-25% of our electricity, more or less its historical contribution, and compensating for the loss of the ageing fleet of current reactors between now and 2030.
Beyond 2030?
Even if we act urgently up to 2030 and achieve everything in these energy security plans, we will not have solved our energy problems. Energy is not just electricity (about 40% of UK energy use is electricity; the other 60% is largely fossil fuels) and we have a legally binding commitment to Net Zero by 2050, so we have to keep our eyes on that longer term goal. Nuclear has a potential role here too, since High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGR) can provide the heat needed to, for example, decarbonise energy intensive processes such as steel making. This was recognised in the 2020 Energy White Paper, but HTGRs are much less mature and, if we don’t push on with them in parallel with the immediate activities, they won’t be ready when we need them.
The IPCC has made it clear that the time is now to act on climate change. While new nuclear won’t come online in time to ensure greenhouse gas emissions peak in the next three years, rapid progress in the sector today will ensure we lock in a low-carbon future for the decades ahead.
Francis Livens is Director of The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute and Professor of Radiochemistry. He has acted as an advisor to the nuclear industry both in the UK and overseas and holds a range of external roles, including Chair of the Nuclear Innovation and Research Advisory Board (NIRAB) and a member of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Board.
The skills gap for long term nuclear future
Aneeqa Khan

The world’s climate and energy crises continues to worsen with extreme weather, heatwaves and increasing global energy prices. The IEA’s net zero by 2050 pathway has identified the need for nuclear, including SMRs growing support for this in the UK, Canada, France and the US. In this blog, Aneeqa Khan discusses the steps needed to develop a framework to secure a long-term nuclear future.
- The UK should invest in multi-level training opportunities for individuals through apprenticeships, undergraduate and doctoral training, as well as cross industry training for people to move into the new nuclear sector, with a focus on fission (including small modular reactors – SMRs) and fusion.
- Provision of a framework for these opportunities should be made available internationally with a focus on developing countries, and those most vulnerable to climate change.
- The UK nuclear industry should develop strong collaborative partnerships with countries with a developing nuclear industry and foster a culture of knowledge exchange.
Long term energy planning versus short term solutions
In August, EDF shut down the two reactors at Hinkley Point B, equivalent to a loss of almost a GW of power generation. They also said they will extend the use of the West Burton A coal power plant, with discussions continuing to potentially keep a further 2 coal power plants open. Billed as ‘short term’ strategies, these interventions do not provide a long term solution, and contradict the aims of the UK Government’s Energy Security Strategy released in April 2022, which aims to deliver clean energy and commits to building one nuclear reactor a year.
We should be extending existing nuclear technologies to cover the bridging over to advanced nuclear reactors, which must continue to receive funding and support. Issues of finance, regulation, the role of Government, siting, public and community acceptance, as well as the integration of nuclear into wider energy strategies including heat and hydrogen must also be addressed. The energy security strategy needs to address training by working with universities and other education providers to ensure there is no skills shortages across these vital areas.
Investing in education and skills
COP26 and COP27 have recently highlighted the need for more young people to be trained to deliver nuclear energy goals. Government investment in nuclear education and training is needed with a key focus on advanced fission (including SMRs) and fusion reactor concepts.
This should include dedicated modules for undergraduate and postgraduate degrees across a range of disciplines; from science, to engineering and regulation, doctoral training centres that address the challenges in delivering advanced reactor concepts, as well as apprenticeships, and training opportunities in advanced reactor concepts for those already working in a relevant field. The University of Manchester offers a fully funded, four-year Centre for Doctoral Training (CDT) PhD in GREEN (Growing skills for Reliable Economic Energy from Nuclear) in addition to the PhD Fusion Energy CDT.
A lack of adequate investment in skills and training could lead to a shortage in the skilled workforce, which the nuclear industry will need to combat the climate emergency, as part of a sustainable energy mix that includes renewables.
Global collaboration
Climate change adversely affects countries and communities that have least contributed to it. Therefore shared knowledge skills may help to catalyse our global transition towards a low-carbon society. This may allow communities most affected by climate change to benefit from the use of new nuclear energy technology.
Policymakers and the nuclear industry need to work with communities directly in an open and transparent way and work with other industries such as housing, water, solar, and wind in order to find synergies and ways we can share mutual knowledge aiming to combat climate change. According to the World Nuclear Association, there are around 30 countries who are ‘considering, planning or starting nuclear power programmes.’ This includes Bangladesh (where it is predicted up to 1 in 7 people could be displaced by climate change by 2050) where construction of power plants have started, as well as countries with developing plans such as Nigeria, Kenya and Laos.
There are challenges in terms of the grid system – if we talk about large power plants it can be difficult to have large amounts of power in one place for an infrastructure not built for that. If the power plant needs to be taken offline for maintenance, this can be detrimental if it accounts for a significant amount of the electricity on the grid. AMRs (advanced modular reactors) and SMRs may be an answer for this as they will be much smaller. Grid infrastructure may require upgrading in general. Other challenges are the licensing of reactor designs, and often countries with developing nuclear rely on countries with developed nuclear power. Sharing skills will allow countries to have autonomy and support in developing nuclear power and therefore transitioning towards secure, clean energy.
There should also be a focus on countries with existing nuclear power, such as South Africa, Pakistan, and Mexico to further expand and collaborate. This will amplify the UKs position as a global leader on climate responsibility and also foster knowledge exchange of technologies, manufacturing and collaboration.
Only with a collaborative approach that crosses man made borders and incorporates multiple industries will we be able to address the skills gap – creating a future where nuclear plays a role in providing low carbon energy.
Dr Aneeqa Khan is a research fellow in Nuclear Fusion working at the University of Manchester at Harwell and in the School of MACE.

Nuclear power - the role of government
Adrian Bull and William Bodel


In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair assured Britain that nuclear was “back on the agenda with a vengeance”. This year the Government has pledged to deliver nuclear at “warp speed”, with all recent Prime Ministers emphasising their support for nuclear. Yet Britain’s first new nuclear plant – Hinkley Point C (HPC) – is still some years from operation and, despite recent progress at Sizewell C, there is no confirmed successor project. In this blog, Adrian Bull and Will Bodel examine the gap between intention and reality and highlight policy recommendations from a new paper by the Dalton Nuclear Policy Group.
- Government should be clear on what it expects for future reactors, particularly concerning size and output.
- Government should make clear long-term decisions, that are consistent, to provide certainty to the market.
- Nuclear programmes must move fast enough to meet the 2050 net zero deadline, and government processes must keep up. This will be particularly crucial to enable an ‘early 2030s’ date for the operation of a demonstration High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) to be met.
Government needs to lead if nuclear is to play its part in hitting Net Zero.
But cost is an issue – conventional reactors like Hinkley Point (HPC) are so expensive that even state-backed EDF didn’t have deep enough pockets to invest without bringing in Chinese partners to take a 1/3 stake. The countries who delivered extensive and rapid rollout of nuclear have all had energy markets which were state-run, and regard the supply of safe, secure electricity as a strategic imperative rather than leaving it to a fickle and uncertain market.
Government’s desire to let markets deliver – but then intervene or backtrack – reduces confidence for investors and the supply chain. Some well-intentioned interventions include:
- The contracts for difference model (used to finance HPC). This was followed by an eventual U-turn on Chinese participation beyond HPC and then adoption of the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) financing model.
- A high-profile competition launched in 2016 by the Department of Energy and Climate Change for the best future small modular reactor (SMR) designs, as part of a £250m investment in an ambitious nuclear research and development programme. This was subsequently downgraded to a consultation, then in February 2022 reissued as an Advanced Modular Reactor (AMR) research, development and demonstration competition.
Free and open competition works well – but takes time and can’t really solve the intertwined crises we currently face of medium-term energy security and longer-term climate preservation. Sometimes a “command and control” approach, putting speed ahead of perfect outcomes, is needed – such as government’s response to the pandemic.
Other factors include very long timescales for delivery of new plants – meaning longer before investors see returns on their money; planning delays; and public opposition if not well handled. Positions on nuclear and its priority for government oscillate, both with changes in leadership and with the other demands facing Whitehall. Brexit, COVID and the current war in Ukraine have, understandably, soaked up precious resources over recent years. All leading to a shaky perception among investors and developers of political commitment and the associated risk.
Perhaps the greatest challenge though is that different aspects of government’s complex role in nuclear sit across Whitehall and are addressed separately. Delivery of new GW-scale nuclear falls under BEIS, whilst longer term innovation on new reactors such as SMRs and AMRs and links with heat and hydrogen supply are elsewhere in BEIS. Then developing the supply chain and value to UK businesses are in yet another area of BEIS. Regulation comes under Work and Pensions. Siting – many prospective sites owned by government-owned NDA. Financing government support is Treasury, while the role of nuclear in levelling up is handled by Communities and Local Government. Suitability of international partners is assessed by the Foreign Office and national security implications through – for example – cyber-risk is Home Office.
With the promised establishment of Great British Nuclear (GBN), government has an opportunity (perhaps its last, if nuclear is to underpin its 2050 Net Zero target, as research shows it can) to catalyse the UK’s nuclear programme via a co-ordinated series of measures, accelerating delivery by picking a course and moving at pace, giving confidence to others to do likewise. This might be the only way to achieve a meaningful fleet of identical units (or multiple fleets, perhaps one for GW-scale plants and others for SMRs and AMRs), and thus bring the benefits – demonstrated elsewhere – from such series build, specifically reduced cost and timescales for developers and repeat business for the supply chain.
Nearer-term specific measures government could usefully take include:
- Establishing GBN with a suitable remit and the power to act across Whitehall, removing blockages and applying appropriate incentives.
- Financial support to encourage series reactor build – encouraging potential first movers, and incentivising subsequent investors to maximise the speed and effectiveness of delivery.
- Widening the scope of financial incentives, potentially on offer to communities which might host onshore wind, to include all low carbon generation – making community engagement a dialogue, not a plea to accept an unknown and largely unwanted technology.
Miss this chance, and the much-anticipated GBN simply becomes another talking shop developing options for endless government review. Then those investors and developers who might have invested in the UK will head abroad, and the opportunity is gone, leaving us with an energy landscape almost impossible to decarbonise.
Adrian Bull is BNFL chair in Nuclear Energy and Society at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. Until June 2022 he was also Director of External Relations for the UK National Nuclear Laboratory. He is closely involved with a wide range of stakeholders including politicians, Government officials, media, customers, industry organisations and universities, and was awarded an MBE for his work on improving stakeholder engagement around nuclear issues.
William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.
How can nuclear help with energy costs - and how do we pay for nuclear?
William Bodel

Europe is struggling through a period of exorbitant energy prices. In addition to directly hitting consumers with a higher cost of living, high energy prices will also have detrimental effects on business and industry. In this blog, Will Bodel from the Dalton Nuclear Institute examines the role of nuclear energy in reducing the cost of energy, and discusses their funding and financing.
- New nuclear energy could provide a significant amount of Britain’s energy needs, which will help insulate against future energy shocks.
- Nuclear energy can be cost-effective, but requires a sensible approach to financing, which Government must facilitate.
- Progress has been made in developing a RAB financing model. The full details of the RAB are yet to be defined, but it is important to ensure that the operational costs are reasonable.
The current energy crisis
In August, Ofgem announced that the price cap (the backstop protection limiting the unit price suppliers could charge for energy), would rise to £3,549 for October-December 2022, a sharp increase from £1,250 last winter. With forecasters predicting prices would hit £4,500 in 2023, Government announced an Energy Price Guarantee, limiting the cap to a lower level to help protect consumers, with the taxpayer compensating energy suppliers the difference.
Government’s medium-term strategy remains to be seen, but it must involve starting to put in place a more resilient energy system to prevent recurrence. While new nuclear power can do little about the immediate problem, it has an important role in the long-term reshaping of the system and preventing such vulnerability in the future.
How could such a situation have been avoided?
One answer would have been a diversification of generation capacity; a broad portfolio of generation technology reduces vulnerability when one source becomes scarce. This is hardly a shocking revelation, and the use of energy supply as leverage is also nothing new – such a sentiment was expressed throughout the 2008 Energy White Paper:
“The majority of the UK’s nuclear power stations are due to close over the next two decades. Over the same period, the UK will become increasingly reliant on imports of oil and gas, and at a time of rising global demand and prices, and when energy supplies are becoming more politicised.”
Coal use had all but vanished in the UK as carbon reductions for net zero were pursued, and only five nuclear power plants remain operational (down from 16 in 2000). Meanwhile, the expansion of renewables proves a double-edged sword as gas is needed to fill in the gaps in their intermittency.
A role for nuclear?
Electricity from nuclear is low-carbon, not reliant on resources located in politically volatile regions, reliable, and cheap to fuel and maintain. Given all this, and if almost 15 years ago it was identified that new nuclear should be built, why is Hinkley Point C still the only nuclear plant under construction?
The reason is financing – a paradox exists on the economics of nuclear. Small marginal costs make nuclear power plants price competitive over their long (60+ year) lifetime, but this is only realised after the large initial capital costs are expended and the plant becomes operational. Long build times must be endured before any return on investment is seen, and it is during this long, high-risk construction period that financing costs balloon to dominate the total cost per unit of electricity (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Breakdown of the nuclear levelised cost of electricity. Reproduced from NEA.
Figure 1. Breakdown of the nuclear levelised cost of electricity. Reproduced from NEA.
Financing options
Since Sizewell B (our most recent nuclear power plant) was built, state-financing nuclear power has been unpopular, and the huge capital costs and long repayment period has deterred private investment – alternative financing solutions have therefore been sought.
In 2012 the government committed to a Contract for Difference (CfD) for Hinkley Point C. This ensures that the operator EDF bears risk in delivering the project and funds eventual decommissioning, albeit with a government debt guarantee. Once built, the CfD guarantees EDF a minimum “strike price” of £89.50/MWh (inflation-linked, so £114 in today’s money) for 35 years after the project completion. At the time, with wholesale electricity prices just under £50/MWh, this was described by many as a bad deal for future bill payers, who are ultimately responsible for paying the strike price – but compared to today’s prices, the HPC strike price look rather better. That said, estimates from the Committee on Climate Change in 2013 predicted onshore wind costs in 2020 of £80/MWh and offshore wind £120/MWh, so the HPC strike price seemed not too bad a deal for reliable, low carbon electricity at the time.
A better deal may not have been possible using this financing method. While the strike price seems high by 2012 standards, the developer in a CfD shoulders the burden of constructing the plant – and the associated risk. Such an undertaking warrants such a strike price. The failure of other contemporary nuclear projects at Moorside and Wylfa (CfDs with lower strike prices) due to financing issues indicates how ineffective this method is for financing nuclear projects.
Alternative financing methods have been proposed, but the one identified as having the greatest potential is the Regulated Asset Base (RAB), the model used to fund Heathrow Terminal 5 and the Thames Tideway Tunnel. The RAB aims to make the whole process more affordable by empowering a regulator to levy charges on consumers while a plant is being built. While this means bill-payers will be paying for a plant which isn’t producing electricity yet, because project owners will be able to settle financing costs sooner in the life of the project (reducing the size of the green slice in Figure 1), this stops the financing costs from spiralling during the construction period. These savings can then be passed on to consumers in the form of cheaper electricity per unit, with figures of £40-£60/MWh being touted for electricity from future nuclear plants built according to this financing model.
The Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill, introducing the RAB for nuclear received Royal Assent in March, but not all the details of how it will be operated have been decided. The latest step in the process, the Government’s consultation on the RAB revenue stream, closed in August and is currently being analysed. As the details are finalised it is important that the Government, and the relevant regulator, ensure the best possible deal for the consumer.
William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.


Analysis and ideas on going nuclear, curated by Policy@Manchester
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With special thanks to our contributors:
William Bodel is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. His previous work concerned life-extension of operating British reactors, and he is currently engaged in future reactor system choice.
Professor Gregg Butler is Head of Strategic Assessment for The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. He has published extensively on a broad range of nuclear topics, and was a member of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management from 2012 to 2019.
Professor Juan Matthews is Visiting Professor in Nuclear Energy Technology at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. With a career spanning over 50 years, he has experience in nuclear and high technology industries across Europe, Asia, Russia and the Americas, and was formerly the nuclear specialist at UK Trade and Investment (now Department of International Trade).
Francis Livens is Director of The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute and Professor of Radiochemistry. He has acted as an advisor to the nuclear industry both in the UK and overseas and holds a range of external roles, including Chair of the Nuclear Innovation and Research Advisory Board (NIRAB) and a member of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Board.
Adrian Bull is BNFL chair in Nuclear Energy and Society at The University of Manchester’s Dalton Nuclear Institute. Until June 2022 he was also Director of External Relations for the UK National Nuclear Laboratory. He is closely involved with a wide range of stakeholders including politicians, Government officials, media, customers, industry organisations and universities, and was awarded an MBE for his work on improving stakeholder engagement around nuclear issues.
Dr Aneeqa Khan is a research fellow in Nuclear Fusion working at the University of Manchester at Harwell and in the School of MACE.
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December 2022
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